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Part 1 – Setting the State Context
1.1 Decisions to Date
H
ealth Insurance Exchange: Florida’s governor and legisla-
tive leadership declined to participate in setting up an Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA) exchange and, indeed, refused
or returned federal grants awarded to facilitate exchange plan-
ning. Instead, the state provided funding for an existing
state-funded exchange for small business and individuals unre-
lated to the ACA that opened with limited services in spring 2014.
Florida led the way in opposition to the ACA. Its then attor-
ney general, Republican Bill McCollum, filed suit against the
Obama administration aiming to have the law blocked as uncon-
stitutional in both its individual mandate and its requirement for
Medicaid expansion. The suit was filed in a Republican-friendly
court in Pensacola, where the federal judge ruled the entire law
unconstitutional. Twenty-five other states joined with Florida in
filing the case. Similar cases in other states led to decisions up-
holding the law’s constitutionality, which brought the issue to the
U.S. Supreme Court in an expedited manner.
To the surprise of many, the Court ruled that insurance is not
commerce and the mandate represented an unconstitutional ap-
plication of the commerce clause. But the chief justice avoided
putting his Court in the position of striking down the Obama ad-
ministration’s signal accomplishment. His vote formed a majority
ruling that the law was nonetheless constitutional because it was a
tax — and as a tax was within the power of the federal govern-
ment to enact and collect it, as the federal taxing power is essen-
tially unlimited. Regarding Medicaid expansion, again breaking
with a long history of contrary precedents, the Court ruled that
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states did not have to comply with the federal expansion order
since the penalty for noncompliance was so severe — losing all
Medicaid funds — as to leave the states no real choice in the mat-
ter. This would make the expansion order an unconstitutional
takeover of state sovereignty.
Florida officials were counting on the Court to invalidate the
ACA. There was no support in the legislature to act on either the
exchange or Medicaid expansion pending outcome of the court
case. Nor did the Republican governor, Rick Scott, elected in 2010
after leaving his role as founder and CEO of Health Care Corpora-
tion of America (HCA), see any reason to begin ACA implementa-
tion planning. He had launched his political career by forming
and financing a political action committee (PAC) to fight
Obamacare in Congress. He expected the ACA to be overturned
and President Obama to be defeated for reelection. Once they had
been disappointed on both counts, the governor and legislature
found it no longer feasible to simply hope the law would go away.
They would have to take a stand.
The stand they took was conflicted. The governor was quick to
say “no.” On Fox News shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court rul-
ing upholding the law, Scott said that his state would not set up
an Obamacare exchange. But the Senate president and House
speaker sent a joint letter to U.S. Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (HHS) Secretary Kathleen Sebelius soon after the
governor’s comments. The letter said that Florida had not made a
decision on how to proceed and indeed would not be able to pro-
vide a declaration letter under the time frame set forth by HHS
because the legislature would not come into session until after the
deadline had passed. If some observers thought that the joint let-
ter signaled the promise of federal-state cooperation, others
thought the real point of the letter was to assert legislative author-
ity over lawmaking, letting the governor know that this legisla-
ture did not intend to be as deferential to the new governor as the
old one had been to Scott’s predecessor, Governor Jeb Bush.
Nonetheless, the letter sounded thoughtful. It cited two factors
preventing state action: 1) The legislature had not authorized the
governor or any state agency to develop and operate an exchange
and would not do so until it convened; and 2) the state lacked suf-
ficient information to fully evaluate the potential impact of choos-
ing one model of exchange over another. The letter indicated three
goals legislators would use in evaluating options: mitigation of
costs for health insurance, assuring a robust health insurance mar-
ket for individuals and small groups, and meaningful consumer
protections.1
While Florida’s legislative session begins late — not until early
March — it has an active interim session when committees meet
monthly and craft bills to be considered by the Senate and House
when they formally convene. The importance of this interim ses-
sion cannot be overestimated with respect to agenda-setting for
the legislative session that follows. Thus, in fall 2013, legislative
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leaders named two select committees on the ACA. The Senate
committee was headed by a longtime, knowledgeable member
who was widely known and respected by legislators and lobbyists
alike (Republican Joe Negron of West Palm Beach, chair of the
Senate Appropriations Committee). The House committee was
headed by a recently elected legislator who was not well known
— some said unknown — among the health lobbying community
(Richard Corcoran of Land O’Lakes, chair of the Health and Hu-
man Services Committee). The select committees were tasked
with assessing the impact of the ACA on Florida, evaluating the
state’s options under the act and making recommendations to
lawmakers. Of special concern were protecting individual choice,
limiting regulatory burdens, and promoting better value in health
care purchasing.2
The first meeting of the Senate select committee was a raucous
affair after a group of smaller-government activists pleaded with
lawmakers to NOT carry out the law. Representatives from Amer-
icans for Prosperity and the Florida Tenth Amendment Center
called the Supreme Court a “monarchy” and said its ruling was
an unconstitutional encroachment of states’ rights. The audience
jeered Democratic committee member and African American Sen-
ate Minority Leader Chris Smith of Fort Lauderdale after he de-
fended the role of the federal government.3
The Senate committee, in particular, seemed determined to get
comprehensive information from both sides of the ideological
spectrum, evidenced by an early committee hearing featuring lib-
eral and well-known health researcher Jonathan Gruber from MIT
(via Skype) and Michael Cannon of the Cato Institute (appearing
in person). Negron made a point that the session wasn’t a “forum
for (sic) a pep rally either for or against the Affordable Care Act,”
but rather was fulfilling the committee’s responsibility to find out
what makes sense in Florida on implementing the law.4
As the first notification deadline passed for states to opt to run
their own federally financed exchange or work with the federal
government to develop a state-federal hybrid model, Florida offi-
cials sent no notice to HHS , thereby allowing the extended dead-
line for signaling cooperation to pass.5
In mid-January 2013, Negron told reporters that while the
state had missed the deadline, it could still enter a partnership
with the federal government to run an exchange or could operate
its own exchange in later years.6 Nothing even close to positive
emanated from the House. On the contrary, both leaders and
members made it clear that they wanted nothing to do with
Obamacare or its dangled federal lucre.
As weeks of the session continued, the health exchange
seemed to fall off the agenda in favor of debate over Medicaid ex-
pansion. In the end, deadlines for signing up for an exchange sim-
ply passed without state action.
Such reluctance to participate in the federal exchange option
might have come as a surprise to some since the Florida
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legislature had actually been an early leader in formulating the
idea of a health exchange to promote competition in health insur-
ance sales. Led by then-Speaker Marco Rubio, now a Republican
U.S. senator from Florida, it adopted a small business exchange
and funded it with state dollars. The plan was Rubio’s own cre-
ation. He offered it as Idea 87 in a book of ideas for making
Florida a better place to live, a product of his legislative campaign
efforts before becoming speaker. The book was called 100 Innova-
tive Ideas for Florida’s Future. The exchange idea was called
“Florida Health Choices”, which he offered in a chapter entitled
“Quality Healthcare at an Affordable Price.”7
Rubio shepherded the idea into law and five years later, in
2013, as the legislature was rejecting the federal health exchange
idea, Florida Health Choices was given additional funding to pro-
vide limited health insurance.
Given this record of favorable disposition toward exchanges
(of his idea, Rubio said, “It’s about competition, it’s about choice,
and it’s about the marketplace.”),8 a welcoming attitude might
have been expected toward the opportunity to set up a state ex-
change with federal money. But that was not to be. Scott may
have summed up the feelings of other policy leaders in an expla-
nation given by his spokesman: “It’s one thing to set up an ex-
change, but when you set it up under the rules that Obamacare
requires, there is no way it reduces the cost of insurance.”9
Yet the new federal law could not be ignored whether Florida
liked it or not. The pressing issue of federal sovereignty meant
that Florida’s insurance laws had put the state’s insurance indus-
try into an awkward position. Firms were required to set rates
and file them with the state, showing that they were in conformity
with state insurance regulations. But those regulations were now
in conflict with federal law, which also applied to these same
insurance vendors.
These conflicts had been noted earlier by the state’s insurance
regulation agency, the Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR). OIR
duties include reviewing contracts, consumer protections, and rate
review for all but large groups, which in this state are thought to be
sufficiently competitive as to obviate the need for regulation. OIR
staff had closely monitored progress of the ACA through its legisla-
tive history and had a list of changes to recommend to the state leg-
islature once the ACA passed. They would have brought Florida
law into compliance with the insurance regulations in the federal
statue. But with the attorney general’s suit to overturn the law, the
state went into a holding pattern. There were no interagency task
forces, no commissions to consider state participation in the ex-
change. In the end, there were only two legislative select commit-
tees — which could not themselves legislate — to consider options.
The legislature finally addressed these conflicts with a single
bill, SB 1842, which became law effective May 31, 2013, well after
the annual February deadline for state rate filing. One aspect of
the bill suspended state rate reviews for 2014 and 2015. The
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suspension was supported by the OIR, which argued it could not
conduct a legitimate review of rates under Obamacare during its
first two years of operation because the state must have two years
of “credible data” on costs to provide a rationale for rate review.
Without credible data, reviews would be subjective and review
findings would not stand up to a court challenge.
Yet it was also true that this suspension avoided conflicts be-
tween existing state rate-setting laws and the ACA. For example,
Florida law allows rates to differ among age groups by wide mar-
gins: an older person’s rates could be as high as a dozen times
higher than a young person’s rates. The ACA permits age-related
rate differences of no more than 3:1. Other regulatory differences
included the definition of small groups, rules on pooling popula-
tions for risk assessment, premium notices, and other features.
With the suspension of state rate review for two years, insurance
companies were able to avoid having to resolve conflicts between
state and federal law.
Nonetheless, OIR’s lack of participation in implementation of
the ACA became evident during legislative hearings. OIR officials
were forced to admit under Democratic questioning that the office
had been ordered to do nothing to prepare for the ACA. They re-
ported that the House speaker-designate (a month before he took
over as speaker) sent a letter to OIR, telling staff they had no legis-
lative authority to work on ACA implementation. So the draft bill
already prepared by OIR staff, designed to conform Florida law to
the ACA, was dropped. “There was no appetite” for it within the
legislature, one observer said.10
SB 1842 did require OIR to set aside its concerns for “credible
data” in one respect: The law “requires insurers to provide a no-
tice to individual and small group policyholders of nongrand-
fathered [new ACA-offered] health plans that describes or illus-
trates the estimated impact of PPACA (Editor’s Note: Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act) on monthly premiums”11 due to
provisions such as guaranteed issue, the ban on excluding appli-
cants with preexisting conditions. Some saw this provision as a
deliberate scare tactic intended to show (or exaggerate) that the
ACA would radically raise insurance premiums.
Though the legislature wanted no part of the ACA’s health ex-
change, another provision of SB 1842 related to health insurance
navigators. It requires them to be licensed by the state Depart-
ment of Financial Services (DFS).
To be registered as a navigator under the bill, an indi-
vidual must certify completion of federally-required
training, submit fingerprints for a criminal background
check, and pay a $50 application fee (currently, there is a
$50.30 fingerprint processing fee for agents, so the total
cost for a navigator would be $100.30). Certain crimes
would either permanently bar an individual from regis-
tration or disqualify an applicant for specified periods. A
navigator will be prohibited from:
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 Recommending the purchase of a particular health
plan or represent that one health plan is preferable
over any other;
 Recommending or assisting with the cancellation
of insurance coverage purchased outside the
Exchange;
 Receiving compensation or anything of value from
an insurer, health plan, business, or consumer in
connection with performing activities as a naviga-
tor, other than from the Exchange or an entity or
individual who has received a navigator grant un-
der the PPACA.
Specifies grounds for suspension or revocation of reg-
istration and authorizes DFS to impose an administrative
fine in lieu of, or in addition to suspension or revocation.
Any person who acts as a navigator without registration
is subject to an administrative penalty not to exceed
$1,500.12
Just days before the federal health exchange was to open, that
department had received only forty applications for licensure
from the roughly 150 expected to need a license, and it had ap-
proved exactly one.13 This, too, might have struck some as at odds
with the state’s history, since Florida health care advocacy and
consumer support organizations had been employing people for
at least five years to help needy individuals sign up for health care
and other benefits offered through a variety of programs. They
even called them navigators, and the principal group employing
them was one of those that won a federal contract to supply navi-
gators for the ACA health exchange.14 Yet in 2013, Scott and the
legislature said they wanted them licensed and subjected to back-
ground checks as a guard against potential for fraud and identity
theft.
Scott and Attorney General Pam Bondi, an early and vocifer-
ous opponent of the ACA, repeatedly blasted the navigator pro-
gram, saying the outreach workers had unreasonable access to
private information. Scott capitalized on a mistake in releasing So-
cial Security numbers to a navigator in Minnesota and petitioned
Congress to review whether privacy rules and safeguards were in
place to protect personal information from exploitation. He wrote
to U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) and U.S.
Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) about the dangers
such mistakes would cause. The letter was released to the public.
These actions were taken in spite of the adoption by Florida of the
law requiring navigators to undergo background checks and en-
abling state officials to establish rules and dismiss navigators who
violated them. Supporters of the ACA cited these laws and
claimed that Scott and his allies were creating a “false sense of
alarm.”15
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Scott also directed the state Department of Health to ban navi-
gators from county health departments, citing privacy concerns.
Pinellas, Broward, and Miami-Dade counties defied the order,
with the Pinellas County Commission chair saying, “it reminds
me of the ‘60s with the governor standing at the door and federal
marshals having to come in.”16 These county leaders, Democrats
all, noted that the counties owned the county health department
buildings, not the governor or Florida Department of Health.
On October 1, Fox News erroneously reported that the United
Way and Enroll America in Coral Gables had navigators going
door-to-door, helping the uninsured navigate through the differ-
ent plans available on the exchange. That report led the Republi-
can chair of the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee to
post an item on the committee website, claiming this was taking
place less than two weeks after the “Obamacare Czar” assured the
committee they would not. In fact, neither Enroll America nor
United Way were navigators, and their officers had testified to
that effect.
The fabulously wealthy, arch conservative, and politically ac-
tive Koch brothers used their money, donated to the National
News Bureau and to the Franklin Center for Government and
Public Integrity and then on to Cause for Action, to generate an
IRS complaint against Enroll America. It alleged that the directors
of the organization were using income or assets for personal gain
and were engaged in commercial, for-profit business activities.
And the Florida chapter of Americans for Prosperity, a conserva-
tive organization promoting limited government, lower taxes, and
more freedom, organized street protests against Enroll America in
Tampa, Orlando, Winter Park, Ft. Myers, Naples, and West Palm
Beach.17
Senator Rubio introduced legislation to suspend the ACA af-
ter the Obama administration delayed opening the act’s Spanish
language sign-up website because of technical difficulties with the
site. Rubio wanted the Affordable Care Act halted until the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) certified the website’s func-
tionality. While Rubio had opposed the use of the GAO as a
certifying agency for immigration reform measures, he was will-
ing to employ the agency in his efforts to repeal and replace the
program.18
Medicaid Expansion: For the ACA legislative special commit-
tees, Medicaid expansion was the 800-pound gorilla in the room
— in part because of possible costs of the program and in part due
to unvarnished politics.
In his speech on opening day of Florida’s 2013 legislative ses-
sion, Speaker of the House Will Weatherford R-Wesley Chapel)
stated his opposition to expansion of the state’s Medicaid pro-
gram because “I believe it crosses the line of the proper role of
government.” Weatherford told a story about his brother’s losing
battle with cancer and his family’s reliance on safety net and char-
ity services like the Ronald McDonald House. He neglected to say
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what safety net services the family received. When asked about
the nature of this safety net program, Weatherford’s father, Bill
Weatherford, said it was the Medicaid program. Responding to
reporters’ subsequent questioning, the speaker suggested that his
father was mistaken and that Medicaid did not cover his brother’s
hospital bills. On the following day, he admitted that Medicaid
had indeed provided his brother with more than $100,000 in care
through Medicaid’s Medically Needy provision. Corrected, but
apparently unpersuaded, he continued to oppose expansion.19
While the speaker’s opposition to Medicaid expansion has
been stalwart and consistent, Scott’s views have, in the assessment
of PolitiFact, “fully flopped.”20 After the Supreme Court decision
upholding the law, he said in a Fox News interview that Florida
would not expand Medicaid, adding that it “just doesn’t make
any sense” and that it was too costly.
Scott did agree to meet on the issue with Sebelius. Scott was
seeking her approval of a Florida Medicaid managed care pilot pro-
gram waiver that had been pending for some months. Following
the meeting on January 7, 2013, the HHS secretary approved the
waiver, but Scott still did not agree to support expansion of the pro-
gram. Although some critics suggested that Scott backed out of a
quid pro quo here, there is little evidence this was the case. The
conditions on the pending waiver had been under consideration for
some time, and the federal government included conditions that
were favorable to its own position, which Florida accepted.
In February 2013, he announced that he still opposed a state
exchange, but supported a three-year Medicaid expansion that
would allow the state to judge if it was working before deciding
to reauthorize it. Scott cited the recent death of his mother for the
new perspective. The governor made little effort to push his
three-year trial in the legislature, and it went nowhere. Although
the governor in February 2014 said he still supported Medicaid
expansion, it was a nonstarter in the 2014 legislative session.
Hospital groups testified in favor of Medicaid expansion, say-
ing it would reduce the amount of uncompensated care they have
to provide. But the House committee chair was unsatisfied, telling
the press that the hospital executives lacked data to show how
their hospitals would be affected.21
The cost issue took up weeks in the key debates over what the
state should do. In early January 2013, Scott announced that ex-
panding Medicaid would cost the state an estimated $26 billion
over ten years. After state budget analysts questioned that esti-
mate, the state’s Medicaid agency (Agency for Health Care Ad-
ministration) revised it to as low as $3 billion.22
Rep. Matt Hudson (R-Naples), vice chair of the House select
ACA committee, complained that the federal government was re-
quiring an “all or nothing” option for the states — not allowing
Florida to partially expand Medicaid with the general federal
match.23 Weatherford and Senate President Don Gaetz (R-Niceville)
also argued that the state — not Washington — should be allowed
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to determine who could become newly eligible for the program.
Gaetz pointed to the distinction between a low-income working
family that needed health insurance and someone who chooses “to
sit on the couch” and not work. But Weatherford insisted that “It
will be a decision based on principle and not on politics.”24
Weatherford seemed to edge more to the politics side of the
continuum a few weeks later when, speaking before an Americans
for Prosperity gathering in March, he said, “I believe we are less
free than we were four years ago, and unfortunately, with the oc-
cupant at the White House, that trend will probably continue for
the next few years.” He went on to call the Medicaid expansion,
“cartel federalism” where the federal government can buy off
states with “so-called free money” to make us more entitled.”25
In mid-April, only a few weeks before the end of the session, it
appeared that the state might expand Medicaid. The Senate select
committee proposed accepting the federal dollars and using them
to fund vouchers that people could use to purchase private health
insurance. This proposal, called Healthy Florida, would accept the
federal dollars but use them to subsidize private coverage for
more than one million uninsured citizens, with the entity that op-
erates the state’s Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in
charge of the expansion. The governor, too, indicated support for
this proposal (generally copied from one offered to HHS by the
state of Arkansas and ultimately approved.)
The problem was that the House didn’t agree. Members were
adamantly opposed to accepting federal funds, even though legis-
lative analysts estimated the amounts to the state at around $50
billion over the decade for coverage of one million uninsured. The
House proposal instead relied on Florida Health Choices — its
own state-funded health exchange. This plan would cost the state
$237 million and would cover around 115,000 people earning be-
low 100 percent of poverty. Participants in the plan would be pro-
vided $2,000 to purchase insurance. They would be required to
contribute $25 a month, and adults would have to work at least
twenty hours a week. The legislature’s own economists concluded
that it would cost taxpayers less if the state instead adopted ACA
Medicaid expansion covering one million uninsured with the gen-
erous federal funding; less than it would cost the state to simply
leave those individuals uninsured; and less than the more limited
Florida Health Choices option.26
House Republicans again said “no deal.” They were willing to
sacrifice billions in Medicaid dollars because they worried that the
state would accept the expansion and then find itself holding the
fiscal bag if the federal government reneged on the deal. “Maybe
it’s the $16 trillion deficit that gives me pause,” said Weatherford.
“The federal government is more interested in expanding a
flawed program.… I don’t think we should be relying, long term,
on a federal solution to our health care needs in the state of
Florida.”27 The House plan, using only state dollars, was also in-
troduced in the Senate in a more reduced form (covering an
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estimated 60,000 people and providing participants $10 a month
toward purchasing insurance).
Weeks passed with no resolution. Competing proposals were
refined, estimates were recalculated, rhetoric was expressed, and
in early May the legislature went home without taking action on
expansion or any other proposal to cover the state’s one million
uninsured. The House and Senate simply couldn’t agree — in
large part because of the intransigence of House leadership. In
mid-April, when the battle lines were clear, Weatherford drew a
line in the sand, saying that since the beginning, the House mem-
bership “felt very strongly that we should not accept federal
funds. That’s been the position of the House from the very begin-
ning. It’s going to be the position of the House till the very end.
There’s been no equivocation on that whatsoever.”28
One small step was taken — the legislature agreed to spend
$900,000 in nonrecurring funding on the Florida Health Choices
program, the state-funded health small business exchange origi-
nally adopted in 2008.
There was considerable talk of a special session to deal with
Medicaid, but there seemed little rationale for it since positions
had not changed. Key business groups, including the Florida
Chamber of Commerce and Associated Industries of Florida as
well as hospital groups, supported the Medicaid expansion, but
were not enthusiastic about revisiting it after the session. There
was some evidence that the issue was still alive — particularly if
state leaders could get some flexibility from the federal govern-
ment. Gaetz, the Senate president, wrote to Sebelius in July, urg-
ing flexibility from Washington in the expansion, both in coverage
and cost-sharing by participants.29
One might wonder where the Democrats and interest groups
representing the poor were during the 2013 debate. They were
there — but not very effective. Democratic members did urge
adoption of the Medicaid expansion and raised the obvious argu-
ments that Florida is at the top or near it in the percentage of resi-
dents uninsured, and that Florida should be doing more to help
its poorest and sickest residents and to create health care jobs fed-
eral dollars. But Republicans occupy all the statewide offices and
roughly two-thirds of the House and Senate, constituting a
supermajority that makes Democrats unneeded for legislative ac-
tion or inaction. So while Democrats could and occasionally did
raise objections and offer ideas, it remains their fate to be largely
ignored. Interest groups for the poor fared little better.
Finally, it is noteworthy that 2014 is an election year for the
House and half of the Senate — not generally a time conducive to
compromise on either principle or politics.
1.2. Goal Alignment
Florida’s zeal in obstructing implementation of the ACA is
best understood in light of the multifaceted nature of the state’s
opposition. Barriers to the law included:
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 Leading the nation in filing suit against the law;
 Quick gubernatorial denunciation of the law and an-
nouncement that “We are not going to implement
Obamacare in Florida. We are not going to expand
Medicaid”;
 House speaker-elect issued a memo to the state Office of
Insurance Regulation ordering it to stop working on any
aspect of ACA implementation;
 Weatherford, the new House speaker, denounced the law
and denied that his family had ever been on Medicaid, de-
spite facts demonstrating the contrary;
 The 2013 legislature formed special committees to consider
Florida’s options, but never considered any bill that would
open the door to cooperating in setting up an exchange or
expanding Medicaid. Instead, lawmakers added money to
a state-funded exchange for small business that would op-
erate in competition with the federal exchange;
 As the session drew to a close without action on the health
exchange or Medicaid expansion, the speaker said that his
House colleagues “felt very strongly that we should not
accept federal funds. That’s been the position of the house
from the very beginning. It’s going to be the position of the
house till the very end. There’s been no equivocation on
that whatsoever.”30
 At the behest of the governor and legislative leadership,
Florida agencies turned back funds they had already won
and rejected others. The New York Times compiled a list of
forsaken federal ACA funds showing that the state had
turned down $25 million in grants, not to mention the per-
haps $50 billion it would forgo in Medicaid matching
funds. The rejected or returned grant funds list included:
 $8.3 million — Osceola County community health
center.
 $4.2 million — Move patients from nursing homes
(total would be $35.7 million over five years).
 $3.4 million — Child and maternal home visits
($31.5 million over five years).
 $2.8 million — Teen pregnancy and sexually trans-
mitted disease (STD) prevention ($11.1 million
over four years).
 $2 million — Enrolling eligible Medicare
recipients.
 $2 million — Medicaid reimbursement for pediat-
ric hospice care.
 $1 million — Strengthen state review of insurance
premium increases.
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 $1 million — Health insurance exchange planning.
 $500,000 — Long-term care resource centers.31
 Florida’s Department of Health announced that navigators
were to be barred from Florida’s sixty-seven county health
departments. County staff would be permitted to distrib-
ute ACA pamphlets, but only if a client requested the
material.
 The legislature passed a law suspending insurance pre-
mium rate review by its state insurance regulator on the
grounds that it lacked sufficient data. But the same legisla-
tion required the same state agency to send letters to pro-
spective insurance purchasers estimating the impact of
Obamacare on their monthly premiums.
 The same law required navigators to be licensed, including
paying more than $100 for the privilege and being sub-
jected to criminal background checks. Details of the provi-
sion restricted navigators’ speech as related to advice they
might give to clients.
 The governor announced an estimate of state costs of
Medicaid expansion that exceeded $26 billion over ten
years. After questioning, that figure was very quickly re-
vised to less than $3 billion.
Part 2 — Implementation Tasks
2.1. Exchange Priorities
Florida will have no role in setting exchange priorities since it
is one of the many states that has chosen not to cooperate in set-
ting up an exchange. No interagency task forces have been estab-
lished; no commissions formed to consider state cooperation with
the exchange; and, in the end, only two legislative select commit-
tees were formed to consider options. State rate review was sus-
pended pending acquisition of two years of “credible data” on
which to base rates. The state law which suspended rate review,
SB 1842, did direct the state insurance regulator to make certain
changes in state policy to conform to the ACA and orders the con-
sumer protection agency to continue doing its job:
 “Authorizes the Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR) to as-
sist HHS in enforcing the provisions of the PPACA by re-
viewing policy forms and performing market-conduct
examinations or investigations for compliance with
PPACA. OIR must first notify the insurer of any noncom-
pliance and then notify HHS if the insurer does not take
corrective action.”
 “Authorizes the Division of Consumer Services within the
Department of Financial Services (DFS) to respond to com-
plaints by consumers relating to requirements of PPACA,
by performing its current statutory responsibilities to pre-
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pare and disseminate information to consumers as it
deems appropriate, provide direct assistance and advo-
cacy to consumers, and require insurers to respond, in
writing, to a complaint, and further authorizes the division
to report apparent or potential violations to OIR and to
HHS.”
The consumer protection agency told field interviewers that it
expects to hire as many as eight temporary workers to help out
with increased call volume as ACA enrollment efforts expand.
Callers will be referred to the federal government’s website,
HealthCare.gov.
2.2 Leadership – Who Governs?
Since Florida utilizes the federal health care exchange, the
leadership lies in HHS in Washington, D.C.
Florida Health Choices, the state’s version of a health coverage
buying website, was under construction over the time period
2008-14. It finally opened on March 4, 2014. The CEO of this orga-
nization is Rose Neff, who came from Florida KidCare, the state’s
low-cost insurance plan for low-income children, supported by Ti-
tle XXI of the Social Security Act. The state-based exchange offers
discount cards and prepaid plans for services like dental and vi-
sion. Florida Health Choices is governed by a board of directors
whose officers include a former Republican state senator, the pres-
ident of a real estate company, and an attorney with the
Gray/Robinson law firm.
2.3 Staffing
The federal exchange staff is located in Washington, D.C.
Florida Health Choices has hired a staff and appointed two
steering committees to advise the board.
2.4 Outreach and Consumer Education
In the absence of participation by the state of Florida in the
ACA, outreach and consumer education about the law is pro-
vided primarily by three organizations: Progress Florida, Florida
CHAIN (Community Health Action Information Network), and
KidsWell.
Progress Florida is a nonprofit organization promoting pro-
gressive values through online organizing, media outreach, and
networking with Florida’s leading progressive organizations. To
support the ACA, it joined with Florida CHAIN to create a
website, Health Care for Florida Now, to educate Floridians about
new health coverage opportunities.
Florida CHAIN and KidsWell are advocacy organizations fo-
cused on health care. Florida CHAIN was launched in 1999. It in-
vestigates and reports on government health care programs,
communicates on health care issues, supports initiatives for vul-
nerable populations, holds community forums, lobbies for pro-
grams that provide health insurance and access to health care, and
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provides expert testimony on issues related to health care in
Florida. During the legislative debate regarding the implementa-
tion of the ACA, Florida CHAIN organized town hall and com-
munity forums in Miami, Palm Beach, and Orlando and secured a
9,000-signature petition demanding a federally facilitated ex-
change for Florida. It also participated with Hispanic Health Ini-
tiatives to place fifty Spanish language public service
announcements and to produce a video in Spanish featuring a
Hispanic small business owner who received health care coverage
under the ACA’s Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan.
KidsWell is a national advocacy campaign focused on “success-
ful health care reform implementation on behalf of children.” Initi-
ated in 2012, it collaborated with Florida CHAIN to host a series of
regional summits in eight cities where over sixty organizations par-
ticipated in discussions about how to improve children’s health
across Florida. The organization also produced a report on the state
of children’s health care in Florida. The report outlines steps to
overcome barriers to enrolling in Florida’s KidCare program and
highlights opportunities to expand coverage under the ACA.
Florida’s Hispanics are a group that insurers want in their
plans. They are younger and healthier than the rest of the popula-
tion, and may pay into the system more than they use in services.
Thus, a large group of advocates worked on the grassroots level to
educate and enroll Hispanic families. Florida Blue, the largest in-
surer in the state, made an effort to reach the group with a mix of
old and new media. It developed a mobile phone app, partnered
with Spanish language bloggers, and formed a partnership with
Navarro, a Hispanic drug store. It also worked with community
health centers where Latinos go to the doctor.
Churches, health centers, and advocacy groups from within
the Hispanic community worked at the grassroots level, and
Spanish language television played a large role. Univision worked
with rival Telemundo, and Univision embedded messages about
health care in programming such as Sabado Gigante and Despierta
America. Finally, Florida residents were reached by federally
funded radio, television, and digital advertising. The Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services spent about $52 million in
Florida and the other twenty-eight states utilizing the federal mar-
ketplace, although no state-by-state breakdown of the distribution
of these dollars is available.32
2.5 Navigational Assistance
As we discussed in Section 2.1 above, the absence of state in-
volvement in the ACA put an independent federal contractor in
control of outreach efforts in the state. On July 10, 2013, Enroll
America, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit organization, came
to Florida and began training organizers who would subsequently
recruit and train volunteers, attract local partner organizations,
and begin knocking on doors in order to help Floridians under-
stand the new medical insurance marketplace created by the
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ACA. Ultimately these organizations hired and put into place 320
individuals to serve as navigators in the state.33 Many of these in-
dividuals came from the infrastructure created by Democrats dur-
ing the previous presidential elections.34
Other Enroll America outreach efforts included dissemination
of information through a Miami Haitian radio show; passing out
information at school events, community colleges, and house par-
ties; and talking to consumers at grocery stores, farmers markets,
community centers, and churches. Key targets were young peo-
ple, specific minority communities, and women. Radio ads were
broadcast in English, Spanish, and Creole.
In addition to this effort, the federal government awarded $7.8
million in grants to eight groups that were to hire navigators to
canvass neighborhoods and help people enroll. The largest of the
grants, $4.2 million, went to the Florida Covering Kids & Families
program, administered by the University of South Florida College
of Public Health, which subcontracted with Florida CHAIN as one
component of its effort. Other recipients were Legal Aid Society of
Palm Beach County ($446,783), Pinellas County Board of Commis-
sioners ($600,000), Epilepsy Foundation of Florida (637,686), Ad-
vanced Patient Advocacy ($413,152), National Hispanic Council
on Aging ($646,825), Cardon Healthcare Network ($238,000), and
Mental Health America ($683,691).
Although it ignored and impeded the Affordable Care Act’s
efforts to provide assistance to individuals seeking coverage,
Florida utilized outreach positions in its own Florida Health
Choices legislation. In addition, Florida health care advocacy and
consumer support organizations employed people for at least five
years to help needy individuals sign up for health care and other
benefits offered through a variety of programs. The Health
Choices program even called the helpers navigators, and the prin-
cipal group employing them was one of those that won a federal
contract to supply navigators for the ACA health exchange.35
Further, as U.S. Senator Bill Nelson, a Democrat, reminded
Floridians in a Tampa Bay Times op-ed, “‘consumer helpers’ have
been serving the people of Florida in various ways for years —
and yes, even with the current governor’s full backing.” These
programs included the SHINE volunteers who help seniors with
questions about Medicare, KidCare navigators who provide infor-
mation about state health insurance for poor children, and state
veteran’s affairs benefits counselors.36
With three weeks left in open enrollment, 442,000 Floridians
had enrolled in a health plan through the federal insurance mar-
ketplace. Over 80 percent of those who enrolled received financial
help in the form of tax credits.37
2.6 Interagency and Intergovernmental Relations
2.6 (a) Interagency Relations. In the absence of an effort to as-
sist residents in finding affordable health care, state agencies went
about their normal duties and, according to officials at the OIR, no
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regular meetings were held among agencies to facilitate the imple-
mentation of the ACA.
2.6 (b) Intergovernmental Relations. When Florida refused to
create its own marketplace, HHS moved to initiate a collaborative
arrangement with the state to accomplish the federal govern-
ment’s responsibility for direct enforcement of the Affordable
Care Act. Spelled out in a letter from HHS to Kevin McCarty, the
state’s insurance commissioner, the agreement stipulated that
Florida’s Office of Insurance Commissioner would review insur-
ance policy forms for compliance with Florida and U.S. laws and
rules; review insurance policy rates for compliance with both
Florida and U.S. law; and perform targeted market conduct exams
and review for compliance with Florida and federal laws and
regulations.
These arrangements were established under the provisions of
SB 1842, enacted by the state legislature in 2013. The law also au-
thorized the Division of Consumer Services in the Department of
Financial Services to respond to complaints related to the ACA
and to report violations to OIR and HHS.
The Department of Financial Services, under mandate from
the Florida legislature, was also authorized to review and license
ACA navigators. Designating navigators as a new category of in-
surance professionals, the legislature required them to be regis-
tered with the department. As indicated in section 2.5 above, this
action appeared to have been motivated as much by animosity to
the ACA as by concern for the professionalism of prospective
navigators.
In a statement to the legislature on January 9, 2014, the deputy
commissioner of OIR outlined the continuing objectives of the of-
fice in the post-ACA marketplace. The office was to maintain mar-
ket stability through a collaborative arrangement with the federal
government to expedite the product approval process and rate fil-
ing information, to monitor off-exchange competition, and to
maintain consumer transparence in the new marketplace through
premium notice requirements.
2.6 (c) Federal Coordination. There is nothing to report on this
topic.
2.7 QHP Availability and Program Articulation
2.7 (a) Qualified Health Plans. When the ACA marketplace
opened in October 2013, HHS announced that Florida consumers
could choose from an average of 102 health plans offered by ten
companies: Aetna, Florida Blue, Cigna, Coventry, Florida Health
Care, Health First Health Plans, Health First Insurance, Health
Options, Humana Medical, and Molina Healthcare. Not all of the
companies, however, planned to sell plans in all counties. More
than half of Florida’s counties were to have only one or two com-
panies selling plans. No county would have plans from all ten of
the participating companies. South Florida, with the largest popu-
lation in the state, would have the largest number of choices,
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while rural residents the least. Seminole and Volusia counties
were to have the greatest number of competing plans, six. Florida
Blue was the only company to offer plans in all 67 counties. Leon
County, home of the state capital, has only one plan — Florida
Blue.
2.7 (b) Clearinghouse or Active Purchaser Exchange. Florida
has no clearinghouse or Active Purchaser Exchange.
2.7 (c) Program Articulation. Florida has officially distanced
itself from Obamacare, obviating the need for articulation.
2.7 (d) States That Did Not Expand Medicaid. By rejecting the
Medicaid expansion portion of the ACA, the state’s legislative es-
timating conference determined that Florida would lose $51 bil-
lion in federal funds over the next ten years. By refusing to adopt
this portion of the act, the state left an estimated 760,000 state resi -
dents ineligible for either subsidies or Medicaid. In a state that
ranked fiftieth in the nation in the number of uninsured adults
(29.5 percent) and forty-eighth in the ranking of uninsured chil-
dren (11.9 percent) , this decision left many observers of Florida
politics perplexed, especially after several studies estimated that
Medicaid expansion would add more than $2 billion to the Florida
economy annually and generate more than 55,000 new private
sector jobs.
Failure to expand Medicaid also had serious implications for
Florida hospitals. The ACA anticipated nearly universal coverage
through Medicaid expansion and included major cuts in subsidies
to hospitals that serve a large number of uninsured patients and
that provide a high level of uncompensated care. In addition, hos-
pitals are facing additional cuts through implementation of a state
Medicaid Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) payment system, na-
tional cuts in the Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment
program, and the termination of the Low Income Pool program
(LIP).
In the early days of the 2014 Florida legislative session, ACA
supporters mounted a new effort to convince the state to expand
Medicaid. The new argument was that not doing so would deprive
some U.S. citizens of health coverage while legal immigrants would
get help to afford it. At issue was a little-noticed provision of the
ACA that allows some low-income legal immigrants to qualify for
subsidies to help them buy private insurance through online mar-
ketplaces. Introduced by Republican State Senator Rene Garcia of
Hialeah, the bill would require the state to expand its Medicaid cov-
erage and accept the funds involved.38 Few observers expected this
argument to be very successful, “but in a state that has a large for-
eign born population, the immigration issue injects a political wild
card into a debate that has largely revolved around ideological dif-
ferences,” Kaiser Health News observed.39
2.7 (e) Government and Markets. Conceived in 2008, Florida’s
private insurance exchange, Florida Health Choices, went live on
March 4, 2014. The exchange offers discount plans for some health
services, like dental services and prescription drugs. These plans
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are not health insurance, and purchasing one does not protect en-
rollees from the individual mandate of the ACA. Serious ques-
tions about its viability remain. Jennifer Tolbert, director of state
health reform for the Kaiser Family Foundation, says there was a
place for such plans before the ACA, but that it is not quite clear
what the need will be now for such plans.
Starkly contrasting with this government-sponsored, essen-
tially Obamacare-defying effort, is the enthusiastic embrace of the
ACA by Florida’s Blue Cross and Blue Shield health insurance
plan, Florida Blue. It is the only company offering ACA-compliant
plans in every one of the state’s sixty-seven counties, making it
the only plan offered in twenty-seven counties. Its webpage and
company blog clearly strive to make ACA plans both understand-
able and an attractive option. Its CEO, Patrick Geraghty, appears
undaunted by uncertainties surrounding the ACA’s rocky roll out
and the potentially unfavorable risk pool that may have enrolled
by the end of the plan’s first open enrollment period.40 He contin-
ues to drive the company into networking and quality improve-
ment collaborations, including ACA-inspired Accountable Care
Organizations, with leading health care provider organizations,
including the Cleveland Clinic of Florida and Moffit Cancer Cen-
ter. Geraghty appears poised to ride the ACA and its disruptive
effects on the existing insurance market to expansion of his firm’s
current 30 percent share of the Florida health insurance market.41
If implementation of the ACA succeeds in Florida, it will be in no
small part due to the marketing efforts and the ACA quality im-
provement and cost-control vision and initiatives of Florida Blue.
2.8 Data Systems and Reporting
The Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA)
has managed the state Medicaid Health Information Technology
Plan since it was authorized by the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009. In February 2011, the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services provided ACHA with approval of the initial
technology plan. This plan described both the existing and future
Medicaid and statewide health information technology activities
in support of health information exchange and electronic health
record adoption.
Part 3 – Supplement on Small Business Exchanges
3.1. Organization of Small Business Exchanges.
As is the case with the health care exchange for individuals, the
federal government runs the SHOP exchange in Florida. Implemen-
tation of this exchange was delayed until November 2014.
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Part 4 – Summary Analysis
4.1 Policy Implications
The debate surrounding implementation of the ACA in
Florida was shaped by political ideology, especially over the ex-
tent to which government should assist citizens in finding health
care for themselves and their families. The clear winners in the de-
bate have been ideological conservatives who control the Florida
state legislature and the governor’s office and who believe that
providing health care to less well-off Floridians is not a role the
state should perform — particularly if it means cooperating with
President Obama’s program. Ironically, some of those who “won”
the debate had families who benefited from the programs they
now refuse to extend to their fellow Floridians. (For example,
Weatherford, the House speaker, whose brother had over
$100,000 in medical bills subsidized by the Florida Medicaid
Medically Needy program).
The clear losers are the estimated 750,000 to 1,000,000 poor cit-
izens in Florida who cannot afford health care coverage, but make
too much money to receive ACA subsidies and who are not cov-
ered because the state did not expand Medicaid. Florida’s citizens
have also relinquished (for better or for worse) control over the
health exchange serving their state.
Other losers in Florida are the state’s hospitals. They face cuts
in DSH payments with no offsetting increase in Medicaid revenue
that would have resulted from expanded coverage of the state’s
lowest-income uninsured hospital users.42
The single bright spot in this otherwise gloomy Sunshine State
story is Florida Blue, the state’s most enthusiastically ACA-
engaged health insurer, which clearly sees opportunities for ex-
panded market share and improved provider performance in the
wake of the ACA’s disruptive influences in the less-than-perfect
health care marketplace.
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